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FAKE ARBITRATION: WHY FLORIDA’S NONBINDING 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE IS NOT ARBITRATION WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
Andrew Daechsel* 
Abstract 
Does the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) govern Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration procedure? At present, this question is unresolved. As its name 
suggests, the FAA generally governs arbitration agreements. But the 
FAA does not define “arbitration,” and the U.S. Courts of Appeals have 
different standards for what constitutes arbitration under the FAA. This 
Note discusses those different standards and argues that the Eleventh 
Circuit provides the most logical test for determining whether a particular 
dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration. Finally, this Note argues 
that, under the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration procedure is not FAA arbitration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Note analyzes whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
governs Florida’s dispute resolution procedure called “nonbinding 
arbitration.” The FAA generally governs the enforceability of parties’ 
written agreements to arbitrate disputes.1 However, the FAA does not 
define “arbitration.”2 Thus, it is unclear whether the FAA governs 
agreements to submit disputes to Florida’s nonbinding arbitration 
procedure.3 This issue is significant because, if the FAA governs 
nonbinding arbitration agreements, then courts will almost always 
enforce them regardless of their unenforceability on other grounds. 
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with various arbitration 
agreements make this clear.4 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not decided 
whether the FAA governs Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure. In 
Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione International, Inc.,5 the 
Eleventh Circuit addressed the enforceability “of a contract clause 
requiring an aggrieved party, prior to filing a lawsuit, to institute 
mediation or non-binding arbitration.”6 The court stated, “[I]f either 
mediation or non-binding arbitration is not FAA ‘arbitration,’ [the] 
agreement is not enforceable under the FAA.”7 The court ultimately held 
that the FAA did not compel enforcement of mediation agreements, so 
the court “reserve[d] for another day whether non-binding arbitration is 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 2. Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he FAA does not define its key term, ‘arbitration,’ and courts have had a difficult 
time defining just what types of procedures are enforceable under the statute.”). 
 3. See, e.g., 1 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § 6:4 (Westlaw 
subscription required) (“[T]here is some debate whether the FAA applies to ‘nonbinding 
arbitration.’”). 
 4. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[O]ur 
cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration. They have 
repeatedly described the Act as ‘embod[ying] [a] national policy favoring arbitration,’ and ‘a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) and Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))). 
 5. 524 F.3d 1235. 
 6. Id. at 1236. 
 7. Id. at 1238. 
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within the scope of the FAA.”8 
While the Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether nonbinding 
arbitration is within the scope of the FAA, it did state a bright-line rule 
outlining the characteristics of a dispute resolution procedure that meets 
the definition of arbitration under the FAA.9 The court also looked to the 
FAA’s statutory purposes to justify its decision.10 Based on the Eleventh 
Circuit’s bright-line rule and reasoning in Advanced Bodycare, this Note 
argues that Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure is not within the 
scope of the FAA. 
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of the FAA. Part II 
chronologically discusses how different courts have addressed the issue 
of whether nonbinding arbitration is arbitration within the scope of the 
FAA. Based on that case law and how other credible sources define 
arbitration, this Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit has developed the 
best test to determine whether the FAA governs a particular dispute 
resolution procedure. Finally, Part III describes Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration procedure, analyzes whether it is arbitration within the scope 
of the FAA, and discusses the importance of resolving this issue. 
I.  WHAT IS THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT? 
For much of U.S. history, most federal and state courts strongly 
disfavored enforcing arbitration agreements.11 Under the “revocability 
doctrine,” many courts allowed parties to get out of arbitration 
agreements if one party to the agreement no longer wished to arbitrate.12 
This doctrine prevailed because many courts felt that contracts should not 
prevent parties from accessing the courts.13 Eventually, businesses 
became disenchanted with courts’ refusal to enforce arbitration 
agreements and lobbied for change.14 In response to this lobbying, 
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.15  
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. at 1240–41. 
 9. Id. at 1239. 
 10. Id. at 1239–40. 
 11. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012). 
 12. Id. at 98–99. 
 13. Id. at 99. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 99–100; see also Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to offset the ‘hostility of American courts to the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 
(2001))); Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 
1621 (2012) (“The FAA was passed primarily to curb ‘widespread judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements.’” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011))); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing 
Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427, 433 (2007).  
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Section 2 is the key provision of the FAA.16 It states that the FAA 
governs written agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise from “any 
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce.”17 Further, section 2 declares that such agreements are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”18 
In passing the FAA, Congress sought to place arbitration agreements 
on “the same footing as other contracts.”19 Despite Congress’s innocuous 
intentions, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA has greatly 
empowered arbitration agreements.20 Instead of enforcing arbitration 
agreements as traditional contracts, the Court has used the FAA to turn 
arbitration agreements into “super contracts.”21 
II.  WHAT CONSTITUTES “FAA ARBITRATION”? 
The FAA clearly governs arbitration agreements. However, arguing 
that an arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA because it is an 
arbitration agreement simply begs the question: What is arbitration? 
Since the FAA does not define this key term, courts have had to do so. 
The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have struggled in this endeavor and 
have reached disparate conclusions regarding what constitutes FAA 
arbitration. 22 The Supreme Court has not resolved this disparity. 
To analyze whether Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure 
qualifies as FAA arbitration, one must first answer the question: What is 
FAA arbitration? Answering this question is essentially a matter of 
statutory interpretation—interpreting the meaning of arbitration as used 
in the FAA. When interpreting statutory text, courts generally start with 
the plain meaning of the text.23 One statutory interpretation guide 
suggests looking first to primary sources such as case law to define 
statutory terms.24 After looking at primary sources, one can look to 
secondary sources such as dictionaries to interpret specific words.25 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Wilson, supra note 11, at 100. 
 17. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 18. Id. 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 20. Wilson, supra note 11, at 97. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Steven C. Bennett, Non-Binding Arbitration: An Introduction, DISP. RESOL. J., 
May/July 2006, at 1, 5 n.9, available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/266ff349-
03e1-4610-a7c1-6cd0f951e8bb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d047cae-3d31-4b6b-b280-
71ed96efa8e5/Bennett,%20Steven%5B2%5D.pdf (“There are conflicting decisions on the 
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to non-binding arbitration.”). 
 23. E.g., KATHARINE CLARK & MATTHEW CONNOLLY, A GUIDE TO READING, INTERPRETING 
AND APPLYING STATUTES 3 (2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/
academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Accordingly, this Part seeks to determine the correct standard for what 
qualifies as FAA arbitration. To do so, this Part first considers how courts 
have defined FAA arbitration, especially in cases that analyze whether 
nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration. Second, it considers how 
dictionaries and other credible secondary sources define arbitration. 
Based on this analysis, this Part concludes by proposing what courts 
should adopt as the correct definition of FAA arbitration.  
A.  Judicial Interpretations of FAA Arbitration 
When interpreting a federal statutory term, courts can look to either 
federal or state common law to define the term, depending on the 
situation.26 However, the general rule is that courts will apply federal 
common law to interpret a federal statute unless Congress has clearly 
indicated that courts should do otherwise.27 The circuit courts are split on 
whether to define FAA arbitration using state or federal common law.28 
Four circuits have held that federal common law applies, while two 
circuits have held that state common law applies.29 In addition to the four 
circuits that favor using federal common law, the Eleventh Circuit relied 
on case law solely from federal courts to interpret FAA arbitration in 
Advanced Bodycare, despite not explicitly stating that the federal 
common law applies.30 This reliance suggests that the Eleventh Circuit 
also favors federal common law. 
This Note assumes that federal common law dictates the definition of 
FAA arbitration for three reasons. First, more circuits have applied 
federal common law. Second, the circuits that favor federal common law 
have provided more compelling explanations to support their conclusion 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No. 
0510135, 707 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit looks to federal common law for the definition of “arbitration” under the FAA, but 
acknowledging the differing approaches taken by other federal appellate courts, such as the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which looks to state law), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 155 
(2013). 
 27. Id. 
 28. E.g., id. (citing Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC, 683 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir. 
2012), and decisions of other circuit courts).  
 29. Id. (holding for the Second Circuit “that federal common law provides the definition of 
‘arbitration’ under the FAA” and noting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Sixth, and 
Tenth Circuits have applied federal common law, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits have applied state common law); see also, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. 
v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 688–89 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding for the Tenth Circuit 
that federal common law dictates the definition of FAA arbitration). 
 30. See Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 
(11th Cir. 2008) (using only federal case law to define a standard for determining whether a 
dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration).  
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than those that favor state law.31 For example, “[t]he circuits that apply 
federal common law have relied on congressional intent to create a 
uniform national arbitration policy.”32 Contrarily, “the circuits that apply 
state law have ‘articulated few reasons for doing so.’”33 Furthermore, 
“[a]pplying state law would create ‘a patchwork in which the FAA will 
mean one thing in one state and something else in another.’”34 Third, the 
Eleventh Circuit appears to favor applying the federal common law.35 
Because this Note addresses Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure, it 
follows the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to resolve the circuit split. 
Since this Note assumes that federal common law dictates the 
definition of FAA arbitration, the following Subsections summarize 
federal case law that addresses whether nonbinding arbitration is FAA 
arbitration. The first case, AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,36 is from the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Even though 
AMF is not an appellate decision, this Note considers it first because 
many appellate courts have relied on AMF to determine whether 
nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration.37 The other cases all come 
from the circuit courts. 
1.  The Eastern District of New York 
In AMF, the Eastern District of New York held that the following 
nonbinding dispute resolution procedure was FAA arbitration.38 The 
parties (two companies) agreed to submit disputes to an advisory third 
party.39 The third party would consider the dispute and issue an advisory 
opinion that did not bind either party.40 Notably, the agreement did not 
mention the word arbitration.41 Despite this omission, the court held that 
the dispute resolution procedure “should be characterized as one to 
arbitrate.”42 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See Bakoss, 707 F.3d at 144 (“We agree with the compelling analysis of the circuits that 
have followed federal law in defining the scope of ‘arbitration’ under the FAA.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 32. Id. at 143. 
 33. Id. at 144 (quoting Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc. v. Wright, No. DKC 12-0282, 2012 WL 
718857, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2012)). 
 34. Id. (quoting Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 218 F.3d 1085, 
1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., concurring)). 
 35. See Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239–40 (using only federal case law to define a 
standard for determining whether a dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration). 
 36. 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 37. E.g., Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A, 111 F.3d 343, 349–50 (3d Cir. 1997); 
see also, e.g., Wosley, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 38. AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460–61. 
 39. Id. at 457–58. 
 40. Id. at 458. 
 41. See id. at 457–59. 
 42. Id. at 460. 
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In its decision, the court stated the following general rule: “If the 
parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by a third party, 
they have agreed to arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision need not be 
binding. . . .”43 In analyzing whether the parties’ particular dispute 
resolution procedure qualified as FAA arbitration, the court focused on 
whether the procedure would “settle” the parties’ dispute and thus 
“provide an effective alternative to litigation.”44 Even though the third 
party’s opinion would not bind either party, the court held that “[v]iewed 
in the light of reasonable commercial expectations the dispute will be 
settled by this arbitration.”45 The court likely found support for 
“reasonable commercial expectations” in its conclusion that “[v]oluntary 
compliance with [the third-party advisor’s] decisions has been 
universal.”46 
2.  The Third Circuit 
In Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.,47 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the following dispute resolution 
procedure found in an agreement between Nissan and its customers was 
not FAA arbitration.48 According to the agreement, before the customer 
could file a civil suit, the customer had to submit the dispute to 
mediation.49 If the parties could not resolve the dispute in mediation, they 
would next submit it to arbitration.50 But the arbitrator’s decision only 
bound the parties if the customer approved.51 Hence, the arbitration was 
binding for one party and nonbinding for the other. If the parties did not 
resolve the dispute within forty days of submitting the claim, the 
customer had fulfilled its obligation under the dispute resolution 
procedure and could file a civil claim.52 
In its opinion, the Third Circuit referenced AMF’s rule that “[i]f the 
parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by a third party, 
they have agreed to arbitration.”53 However, the Third Circuit narrowed 
this rule somewhat, adding the requirement that the parties agree to 
arbitrate their dispute all the way to the arbitrator’s issuance of a 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 460–61. 
 45. See id.  
 46. See id. at 458. 
 47. 111 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 48. Id. at 346, 351. 
 49. Id. at 345–46. 
 50. Id. at 346. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 345–46. 
 53. Id. at 350 (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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decision.54 In other words, if the dispute resolution procedure allows the 
parties to submit their dispute to traditional litigation before the arbitrator 
has issued a decision, then the dispute resolution procedure is not FAA 
arbitration.55 
The Third Circuit reasoned that the dispute resolution procedure in 
this case was not FAA arbitration mainly because parties would not 
arbitrate many claims to their conclusion.56 Since many plaintiffs would 
be able to file a civil claim after forty days elapsed, the dispute resolution 
procedure would not proceed to an arbitrator’s final decision in a number 
of cases.57 Therefore, the procedure was not FAA arbitration. 
3.  The Ninth Circuit 
In Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc.,58 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit addressed for the first time whether nonbinding 
arbitration was FAA arbitration.59 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
following three-step dispute resolution procedure was FAA arbitration.60 
First, the parties would meet and attempt to resolve the dispute.61 If that 
failed, the parties would attempt to resolve the dispute in nonbinding 
arbitration.62 If nonbinding arbitration also failed, the parties would 
litigate the dispute in federal court.63 
The Ninth Circuit used AMF and Harrison to formulate a standard for 
determining whether nonbinding arbitration constitutes FAA 
arbitration.64 The court referred to AMF’s ruling that “parties agree to 
submit to arbitration under the FAA when they ‘agree[ ] to submit a 
dispute for a decision by a third party.’”65 Referencing Harrison, the 
Ninth Circuit added that, “according to the Third Circuit’s analysis, the 
parties must not only agree to submit the dispute to a third party, but also 
agree not to pursue litigation ‘until the process is completed.’”66 The 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. (“[T]he essence of arbitration, we think, is that, when the parties agree to submit 
their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate these disputes through to completion, i.e. to an 
award made by a third-party arbitrator.”). 
 55. Id. (“Arbitration does not occur until the process is completed and the arbitrator makes 
a decision.”). 
 56. Id. at 351. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 59. Id. at 1207–09. 
 60. Id. at 1206, 1209. 
 61. Id. at 1206. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 1208–09. 
 65. Id. at 1208 (alteration in original) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 
456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 66. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 111 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 
1997)). 
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Ninth Circuit also noted that neither AMF nor Harrison “held that the 
arbitrator[s’] decision must be binding for the FAA to apply.”67 
Based on this standard, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the dispute 
resolution procedure at issue was FAA arbitration because it: (1) “clearly 
provide[d] for the submission of claims to ‘a third party’”68 and (2) “d[id] 
not explicitly permit one of the parties to ‘seek recourse to the courts’ 
after submitting claims for non-binding arbitration but before the ‘process 
is completed and the arbitrator makes a decision.’”69 Additionally, the 
court noted, “A final factor weighing in favor of viewing the dispute 
resolution procedures . . . as ‘arbitration’ is the presumption in favor of 
arbitrability created by the FAA.”70 
4.  The Fourth Circuit 
In United States v. Bankers Insurance Co.,71 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that the following dispute resolution procedure 
was FAA arbitration.72 A federal government agency and a private 
business agreed to arbitrate disputes that arose between them.73 However, 
the arbitrator’s decision was only binding if the government agency 
approved it.74 In other words, the arbitration was binding for one party 
and nonbinding for the other party. 
The Fourth Circuit did not definitively state the standard it used to 
determine whether the dispute resolution procedure was FAA 
arbitration.75 Referencing Wolsey and Harrison, the Fourth Circuit first 
stated, “Some courts have chosen to focus on whether the arbitration 
process is likely to resolve the issues, and whether the parties ‘agree not 
to pursue litigation until the process is completed.’”76 Next, referencing 
AMF, the Fourth Circuit stated, “In evaluating a similar issue, [the 
Eastern District of New York] observed, ‘The arbitrator’s decision need 
not be binding . . . [as long as there are] reasonable commercial 
expectations [that] the dispute will be settled by this arbitration.’”77 These 
brief statements were the extent of the court’s explanation of a rule for 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1209 (quoting AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460). 
 69. Id. (quoting Harrison, 111 F.3d at 350). 
 70. Id. 
 71. 245 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 72. Id. at 317–25. 
 73. Id. at 317–18. 
 74. Id. (providing the specific text of the arbitration agreement, which stated that the 
arbitrator’s decision was “binding upon approval by the [government agency]” (emphasis 
added)). 
 75. See id. at 322–23. 
 76. Id. at 322 (quoting Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 
1998)). 
 77. Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460–61 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
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whether nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration. 
The Fourth Circuit then conducted a brief two-paragraph analysis in 
which it acknowledged the legitimate possibility that the dispute 
resolution procedure might not resolve the parties’ dispute.78 Despite this 
possibility, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “because the [government 
agency] would presumably act reasonably and rationally, and would 
approve an arbitration award or decision that it found favorable, we are 
unable to conclude that arbitration proceedings would be futile.”79 
5.  The Third Circuit Strikes Again 
In Dluhos v. Strasberg,80 the Third Circuit again analyzed whether 
nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration.81 The Third Circuit held that 
the dispute resolution procedure in this case was also not FAA 
arbitration.82 The contract at issue required one party “to submit to a 
‘mandatory administrative proceeding’ before an approved dispute 
resolution service provider to resolve” certain disputes.83 Despite 
contractual language asserting that the dispute resolution procedure was 
mandatory, the contract allowed parties to bring claims in court without 
participating in the dispute resolution procedure.84 
The Third Circuit did not articulate a general standard for what 
constitutes FAA arbitration, but it did shed more light on what the correct 
analysis would entail. In explaining the concept of FAA arbitration, the 
Third Circuit first restated its previous conclusion from Harrison:  
[T]he essence of arbitration . . . is that, when the parties agree 
to submit their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate 
these disputes through to completion, i.e. to an award made 
by a third-party arbitrator. Arbitration does not occur until 
the process is completed and the arbitrator makes a 
decision.85  
But the Third Circuit then went on to minimize this rule saying, 
“Admittedly, this definition does little to assist us in determining which 
types of dispute resolution fall under the FAA and which do not.”86 
The Third Circuit seemed much more concerned with whether, in light 
of reasonable commercial expectations, the dispute resolution procedure 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. at 322–23.  
 79. Id. at 323. 
 80. 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 81. Id. at 366, 370. 
 82. Id. at 373. 
 83. Id. at 367 (quoting the relevant dispute resolution policy). 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 369–70 (quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 11 F.3d 343, 350 (3d 
Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Id. at 370. 
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would resolve the dispute (referencing AMF).87 The Third Circuit’s 
reasoning further shows the importance of the dispute resolution 
procedure’s finality because each of the three reasons supporting its 
decision included the concept of finality.88 
6.  The Tenth Circuit 
In Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Management Planning, Inc.,89 
two media companies entered into an option agreement giving one of the 
media companies the future option to purchase a newspaper owned by 
the other.90 The option agreement contained a rather complicated 
procedure for resolving any disputes between the parties related to the 
fair market value of the newspaper.91 Eventually, the parties ended up in 
court, and the issue arose as to whether this procedure was FAA 
arbitration.92 To determine whether this dispute resolution procedure was 
FAA arbitration, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit focused 
on whether the procedure would definitively settle the parties’ dispute, 
not whether the procedure was likely to resolve the dispute.93 Because the 
procedure would not definitively settle the parties’ dispute, the Tenth 
Circuit held that it was not FAA arbitration.94 
7.  The Eleventh Circuit 
In Advanced Bodycare, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that the 
FAA does not govern mediation.95 While the court did not decide whether 
                                                                                                                     
 87. See id. at 371–72. 
 88. First, the Third Circuit stated that the dispute resolution procedure “obviously 
contemplates the possibility of judicial intervention, as no provision of the policy prevents a party 
from filing suit before, after or during the administrative proceedings. . . . In that sense, this 
mechanism would not fall under the FAA because ‘the dispute will [not necessarily] be settled by 
this arbitration.’” Id. at 371 (alteration in original) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. 
Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). Second, the Third Circuit stated that the dispute resolution 
procedure resolves a “dispute only to the extent that a season-finale cliffhanger resolves a sitcom’s 
storyline—that is, it doesn’t.” Id at 372. Third, the Third Circuit noted that the dispute resolution 
procedure clearly allowed the parties to seek judicial review of the third party’s decision; 
therefore, “the FAA, which applies only to binding proceedings likely to realistically settle the 
dispute,” did not govern the dispute resolution procedure. Id. at 372–73 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 89. 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 90. Id. 686–87. 
 91. Id. at 687. 
 92. Id. at 686. 
 93. Id. at 689–91. 
 94. Id. at 690–91. 
 95. Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that mediation “is not ‘arbitration’ within the meaning of the FAA”). 
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nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration,96 it did set forth guidelines for 
determining whether a particular dispute resolution procedure is FAA 
arbitration. These guidelines are very useful in determining whether 
nonbinding arbitration in Florida is FAA arbitration. 
When determining whether a particular dispute resolution procedure 
constitutes FAA arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit will consider whether 
the procedure possesses the common factors of traditional arbitration, 
which include “(i) an independent adjudicator, (ii) who applies 
substantive legal standards . . . , (iii) considers evidence and argument 
(however formally or informally) from each party, and (iv) renders a 
decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties, 
typically by awarding damages or equitable relief.”97 This is a flexible 
test because “[t]he presence or absence of any one of these circumstances 
will not always be determinative.”98 
In deciding Advanced Bodycare, the Eleventh Circuit focused mainly 
on the fourth factor and set forth the following bright-line rule regarding 
that factor: “If a dispute resolution procedure does not produce some type 
of award that can be meaningfully confirmed, modified, or vacated by a 
court upon proper motion, it is not arbitration within the scope of the 
FAA.”99 This rule, and the reasoning behind it, is particularly useful in 
determining whether nonbinding arbitration in Florida is FAA arbitration. 
The court justified its bright-line rule with the FAA’s statutory 
purposes. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted, “The purpose of the 
FAA is to ‘relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an 
alternative method of dispute resolution that is speedier and less costly 
than litigation.’”100 The FAA’s purpose will only be met if the dispute 
resolution procedure in question “is an alternative to litigation, not an 
additional layer in a protracted contest.”101 Therefore, it only makes sense 
for the FAA to govern a particular dispute resolution procedure if that 
procedure produces some sort of meaningful, final award.102 The 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 1240–41 (“[W]e reserve for another day whether non-binding arbitration is within 
the scope of the FAA.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 97. Id. at 1239. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. It is important to note, however, that the inverse of this rule is not true. Id. at 1239 
n.3 (“The inverse is not true, however. The presence of an award does not by itself make a 
procedure ‘arbitration’ if the procedures that produce the award bear no resemblance to classic 
arbitration. The parties could not contract for a binding coin flip, with the winner to receive an 
award of his choice, and expect the agreement to be enforced under the FAA.”). 
 100. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 
508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 101. Id. at 1240 (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907 
(11th Cir. 2006), abrogation recognized by Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 
1197 (11th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Id. at 1239. 
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Eleventh Circuit has noted that “the FAA presumes that the arbitration 
process itself will produce a resolution independent of the parties’ 
acquiescence—an award which declares the parties’ rights and which 
may be confirmed with the force of a judgment.”103 If the dispute 
resolution procedure in question does not bind a party, then compelling a 
party to partake in that procedure under the FAA may very well run 
counter to the FAA’s goals.104 That is, forced participation in arbitration 
may increase the amount of time and money spent resolving the 
dispute.105 
B.  The Plain Meaning of “Arbitration” 
In addition to looking at case law when interpreting statutory text, it 
is also useful to consider secondary sources, such as dictionaries.106 This 
Section examines how credible sources define arbitration. It does so by 
considering definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, the American 
Arbitration Association,107 and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.108 Considering definitions from these sources clarifies 
three important characteristics of arbitration: (1) it produces a final and 
binding decision, (2) it is an alternative to litigation, and (3) one or more 
neutral third parties govern the proceeding.  
First, arbitration clearly refers to dispute resolution procedures that 
produce a final and binding decision. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
arbitration as “[a] method of dispute resolution . . . whose decision is 
binding.”109 Likewise, the American Arbitration Association states that 
“[a]rbitration is the submission of a dispute . . . for a final and binding 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 1240. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (“Unlike submitting a dispute to a private adjudicator, which the FAA contemplates, 
compelling a party to submit to settlement talks it does not wish to enter and which cannot resolve 
the dispute of their own force may well increase the time and treasure spent in litigation.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 106. See CLARK & CONNOLLY, supra note 23, at 4–5. 
 107. The American Arbitration Association “was founded in 1926, following enactment of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, with the specific goal of helping to implement arbitration as an out-
of-court solution to resolving disputes.” AAA Mission and Principles, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about/mission (last visited May 1, 2015). Additionally, the 
American Arbitration Association “has a long history and experience in the field of alternative 
dispute resolution, providing services to individuals and organizations who wish to resolve 
conflicts out of court.” About the American Arbitration Association (AAA), AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 108. The World Intellectual Property Organization is “a self-funding agency of the United 
Nations, with 188 member states” and “is the global forum for intellectual property services, 
policy, information and cooperation.” Inside WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 109. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
13
Daeschsel: Fake Arbitration: Why Florida's Nonbinding Arbitration Proceudre
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1294 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
decision, known as an ‘award.’”110 The World Intellectual Property 
Organization agrees that arbitration produces a final and binding 
decision.111 The only indication that arbitration could possibly refer to a 
decision that does not produce a final and binding decision comes from 
the American Arbitration Association’s statement that “[a]wards . . . are 
generally final and binding on the parties in the case.”112  
Second, arbitration clearly refers to dispute resolution mechanisms 
that are alternatives to courtroom litigation. The American Arbitration 
Association states that arbitration is a “cost-effective alternative to 
litigation.”113 Similarly, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
notes that “[i]n choosing arbitration, the parties opt for a private dispute 
resolution procedure instead of going to court.”114  
Finally, arbitration refers to dispute resolution mechanisms that 
neutral third parties govern. Black’s Law Dictionary defines arbitration 
as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third 
parties.”115 The American Arbitration Association states that 
“[a]rbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial 
persons.”116 
C.  The Correct Interpretation of FAA Arbitration 
This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit has created the best 
standard for determining whether a particular dispute resolution 
procedure constitutes FAA arbitration. Specifically, it suggests that 
courts should follow the Eleventh Circuit’s four-factor test and the bright-
line rule related to the fourth factor of that test. Therefore, in the following 
Part, this Note uses the Eleventh Circuit’s standard to analyze whether 
Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure is FAA arbitration. 
In Wolsey, the Ninth Circuit built on the reasoning of the Third Circuit 
and the Eastern District of New York to conclude that the dispute 
resolution procedure at issue was FAA arbitration.117 However, the court 
missed the mark in that case because it focused too much on whether the 
dispute resolution procedure provided for submission of the claim to a 
third party and not enough on whether the procedure would produce a 
                                                                                                                     
 110. Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/
disputeresolutionservices/arbitration (last visited May 1, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 111. The World Intellectual Property Organization states that arbitration produces “a binding 
decision on the dispute.” What Is Arbitration?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/what-is-arb.html (last visited May 1, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
 112. Arbitration, supra note 110 (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. See What Is Arbitration?, supra note 111 (emphasis added). 
 115. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109 (emphasis added). 
 116. Arbitration, supra note 110 (emphasis added). 
 117. Supra Subsection II.A.3. 
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final decision.118 The Eleventh Circuit’s standard places more emphasis 
on whether the dispute resolution procedure produces a final decision.119 
Given the FAA’s purpose of increasing the efficiency of dispute 
resolution and ensuring that arbitration is “‘an alternative to litigation, not 
an additional layer in a protracted contest,’”120 the Eleventh Circuit’s 
final decision standard is superior and better determines whether a 
particular dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration. 
It also seems that the Ninth Circuit missed the mark in Wolsey with its 
reasoning that the dispute resolution procedure in question should be 
FAA arbitration because the FAA creates a presumption in favor of 
arbitration.121 Although there is no question that the FAA creates a 
presumption in favor of arbitration,122 it seems that the court misapplied 
this presumption. The presumption appears to favor enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate when it is clear that the parties agreed to undergo 
arbitration as governed by the FAA. Thus, when the parties have actually 
agreed to FAA arbitration, courts should presume that the agreement 
itself is enforceable or that the dispute or controversy at issue is within 
the scope of the agreement. It does not mean, however, that where it is 
unclear whether the parties agreed to a dispute resolution procedure 
within the scope of the FAA the court should presume that the dispute 
resolution procedure actually is FAA arbitration. 
III.  DOES THE FAA GOVERN FLORIDA’S NONBINDING 
ARBITRATION? 
Now that this Note has determined (or at least argued for) the correct 
meaning of FAA arbitration, it can address its ultimate question: Does the 
FAA govern Florida’s nonbinding arbitration? In other words, is 
Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure FAA arbitration? To answer 
this question, this Part first describes Florida’s nonbinding arbitration 
procedure. Next, this Part uses the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for FAA 
arbitration123 to analyze whether the FAA governs Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration procedure. This Part concludes by describing the importance 
of resolving whether the FAA governs Florida’s nonbinding arbitration 
procedure. 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 119. See supra Subsection II.A.7. 
 120. Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907 (11th Cir. 
2006), abrogation recognized by Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th 
Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. See Wolsey, 144 F.3d at 1209.  
 122. E.g., id. 
 123. Supra Subsection II.A.7. 
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A.  Florida’s Nonbinding Arbitration Procedure 
In Florida, nonbinding arbitration is a statutorily defined process 
governed by Florida Statutes § 44.103 and Florida Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1.800 and 1.820.124 Florida Statutes § 44.103(1) authorizes the 
Florida Supreme Court to establish “rules of practice and procedure” for 
conducting nonbinding arbitration.125 The Florida Supreme Court has 
done so in Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.800 and 1.820.126 
In Florida, a chief arbitrator runs the nonbinding arbitration 
proceeding.127 Before the proceeding, the arbitration tribunal sends a 
notice of arbitration to the parties explaining the nonbinding arbitration 
procedures.128 
Compared to a traditional trial, nonbinding arbitration is relatively 
informal.129 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure instruct parties to 
minimize witness testimony.130 Instead, the parties’ attorneys do most of 
the talking.131 Additionally, parties have a strong incentive to appear: 
even if a party is not present, “the chief arbitrator may proceed with the 
hearing and the arbitration panel shall render a decision based upon the 
facts and circumstances as presented by the parties present.”132 
Typically, the parties have thirty days to complete the proceeding.133 
If the parties need more time, they or the chief arbitrator may move for 
an extension.134 At most, the court can grant the parties an additional 
thirty days to arbitrate.135 Therefore, even with an extension, the parties 
must complete the proceeding within sixty days of the first proceeding.136 
After the proceeding concludes, the arbitrator issues a decision 
regarding the dispute.137 If there is a panel of arbitrators, a majority vote 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See Daniel Morman & Jonathan Whitcomb, Navigating the Nonbinding Arbitration 
Minefield in Florida, FLA. B.J., May 2007, at 18, available at http://www.floridabar.org/
divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/A850836D44B9279E852572C90056C2BD. 
 125. FLA. STAT. § 44.103 (2013). 
 126. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.800 (detailing exclusions from arbitration); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820 
(detailing hearing procedures for nonbinding arbitration). 
 127. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(a). 
 128. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(b)(1)–(2). 
 129. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(c). 
 130. Id. (“Presentation of testimony shall be kept to a minimum.”). 
 131. Id. (“[M]atters shall be presented to the arbitrator(s) primarily through the statements 
and arguments of counsel.”). 
 132. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(e). 
 133. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(1).  
 134. Id. (“Arbitration shall be completed within 30 days of the first arbitration hearing unless 
extended by order of the court on motion of the chief arbitrator or of a party.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (“No extension of time shall be for a period exceeding 60 days from the date of the 
first arbitration hearing.”). 
 137. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(2) (“Upon the completion of the arbitration process, the 
arbitrator(s) shall render a decision.”). 
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determines the outcome.138 The arbitrator must notify the parties of the 
decision in writing no later than ten days after the proceeding 
concludes.139 The arbitrator’s written decision may “set forth the issues 
in controversy and the arbitrator(’s)(s’) conclusions and findings of fact 
and law.”140 Finally, “[t]he arbitrator(’s)(s’) decision and the originals of 
any transcripts shall be sealed and filed with the clerk at the time the 
parties are notified of the decision.”141 
As the name nonbinding arbitration suggests, the arbitrator’s decision 
is not necessarily final. After the arbitrator issues the decision, parties 
may move for a new trial.142 However, parties must do so no later than 
twenty days after service of the decision.143 After twenty days, the 
decision is final.144 
Florida Statutes § 44.103 seems to encourage parties to move for a 
new trial only if they think the arbitrator’s decision is significantly unfair. 
Specifically, § 44.103 authorizes the court, upon a motion by either party, 
to “assess costs against the party requesting a [new] trial.”145 These costs 
include “arbitration costs, court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and 
other reasonable costs.”146 
When the plaintiff requests a new trial, there are other potential 
consequences. If the plaintiff “obtains a judgment at trial which is at least 
25 percent less than the arbitration award,”147 then “the costs and 
attorney’s fees . . . shall be set off against the award.”148 Further, “[w]hen 
the costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to this section total more than the 
amount of the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant 
against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and attorney’s fees, less 
the amount of the award to the plaintiff.”149 When the court is 
determining whether to assess costs against the plaintiff, “the term 
‘judgment’ means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus all 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Id. (“In the case of a panel, a decision shall be final upon a majority vote of the panel.”). 
 139. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(3) (“Within 10 days of the final adjournment of the arbitration 
hearing, the arbitrator(s) shall notify the parties, in writing, of their decision.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See FLA. STAT. § 44.103(5) (2013); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(h). 
 143. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(h). 
 144. Id. (providing that if the parties do not meet the twenty-day deadline, “the [arbitrator’s] 
decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as 
may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida 
Statutes”). 
 145. FLA. STAT. § 44.103(6). 
 146. Id. These “reasonable costs” include, but are not limited to, “investigation expenses and 
expenses for expert or other testimony which were incurred after the arbitration hearing and 
continuing through the trial of the case in accordance with the guidelines for taxation of costs as 
adopted by the Supreme Court.” Id. 
 147.  Id. § 44.103(6)(a). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
17
Daeschsel: Fake Arbitration: Why Florida's Nonbinding Arbitration Proceudre
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1298 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
taxable costs pursuant to the guidelines for taxation of costs as adopted 
by the Supreme Court.”150 It also includes “any postarbitration collateral 
source payments received or due as of the date of the judgment, and plus 
any postarbitration settlement amounts by which the verdict was 
reduced.”151 
When the defendant moves for a new trial, there are also potential 
consequences if the “judgment entered against the defendant . . . is at least 
25 percent more than the arbitration award.”152 In such a situation, “the 
costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to this section shall be set off against 
the award.”153 When the court is determining whether to assess costs 
against the defendant, “the term ‘judgment’ means the amount of the net 
judgment entered, plus any postarbitration settlement amounts by which 
the verdict was reduced.”154  
Thus, Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedures clarify that, while 
a nonbinding arbitration decision in Florida is not inherently binding, it 
has the potential to become binding if the parties do not adhere to a set of 
rather strict guidelines. Lawyers must pay close attention to procedural 
rules to ensure that nonbinding arbitration does not actually bind the 
parties. 
B.  The FAA Does Not Govern Florida’s Nonbinding 
Arbitration Procedure 
Based on the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for FAA arbitration in 
Advanced Bodycare, nonbinding arbitration in Florida is not FAA 
arbitration. This is true even though Florida’s nonbinding arbitration 
meets three of the four factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s standard. 
Nonbinding arbitration’s failure to meet the fourth factor—that the 
dispute resolution procedure results in a final award—outweighs its 
compliance with the first three factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
standard.155 
Nonbinding arbitration, as defined by Florida Statutes § 44.103, meets 
three of the four factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for FAA 
arbitration. Nonbinding arbitration meets the first factor—that the 
arbitration has an independent adjudicator156—because an independent 
chief arbitrator runs nonbinding arbitration.157 It also meets the second 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. § 44.103(6)(b). 
 153. See id. § 44.103(6)(a)–(b). 
 154. Id. § 44.103(6)(b).  
 155. See Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(a) (“The chief arbitrator shall have authority to commence 
and adjourn the arbitration hearing and carry out other such duties as are prescribed by section 
44.103, Florida Statutes.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 44.103(4) (“Any party to the arbitration may 
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factor—that the independent adjudicator apply substantive legal 
standards158—because the chief arbitrator must apply substantive legal 
standards in reaching the final arbitration decision.159 Finally, nonbinding 
arbitration meets the third factor—that the chief arbitrator “consider[] 
evidence and argument (however formally or informally) from each 
party”160—because, although the process is informal, the arbitrator hears 
arguments and accepts evidence from both parties.161 
Although nonbinding arbitration meets the first three factors, it does 
not meet the fourth factor—that the independent adjudicator “render[] a 
decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties, 
typically by awarding damages or equitable relief.”162 This is arguably 
the most important factor, and, even though nonbinding arbitration in 
Florida meets the first three factors, its failure to satisfy the fourth factor 
strongly supports a conclusion that nonbinding arbitration is not FAA 
arbitration.163 The remainder of this Section discusses the reasoning 
behind that conclusion in more detail. 
In Advanced Bodycare, the Eleventh Circuit decided that mediation 
was not FAA arbitration. In making its decision, the Eleventh Circuit only 
analyzed the fourth factor of its test—whether mediation “renders a 
decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties.”164 
Because mediation did not meet this factor, the Eleventh Circuit decided 
that it was not FAA arbitration.165 By deciding the issue based solely on 
the fourth factor, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of this 
factor and suggested that other courts could do the same regarding 
nonbinding arbitration. The fact that many other authorities define 
arbitration as a process that is final and binding also emphasizes the 
fourth factor’s importance.166 Therefore, if nonbinding arbitration does 
not “render[] a decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of 
                                                                                                                     
petition the court in the underlying action, for good cause shown, to authorize the arbitrator to 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, records, documents, 
and other evidence at the arbitration and may petition the court for orders compelling such 
attendance and production at the arbitration. Subpoenas shall be served and shall be enforceable 
in the manner provided by law.”). 
 158. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239. 
 159. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(3) (explaining that in its decision, the arbitrator may “set 
forth the issues in controversy and the arbitrator(’s)(s’) conclusions and findings of fact and law”). 
 160. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239. 
 161. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820 (“The hearing shall be conducted informally. Presentation of 
testimony shall be kept to a minimum, and matters shall be presented to the arbitrator(s) primarily 
through the statements and arguments of counsel.”). 
 162. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239. 
 163. See id. (“Although we acknowledge that there are few clear rules in delineating the 
bounds of FAA arbitration, we believe there is one that controls this case. The FAA clearly 
presumes that arbitration will result in an ‘award’ declaring the rights and duties of the parties.”). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at 1240. 
 166. See supra Section II.B. 
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the parties,”167 courts should not classify it as FAA arbitration.  
Although not as clearly as with mediation, Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration procedure does not “render[] a decision that purports to 
resolve the rights and duties of the parties.”168 Unlike mediation, where 
the mediator does not deliver a decision at the conclusion of the 
mediation,169 in nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator does deliver a 
decision that may “set forth the issues in controversy and the 
arbitrator(’s)(s’) conclusions and findings of fact and law.”170 While the 
arbitrator technically “renders a decision,” that decision does not 
“purport[] to resolve the rights and duties of the parties”171 because the 
parties may move for a new trial within twenty days. If a party makes this 
motion, then there will be a new trial and the arbitrator’s decision will 
have absolutely no weight in the outcome of the case. Judges in the new 
trial cannot even use the arbitration decision to guide their own decision 
because they are forbidden from seeing the decision.172 The Florida 
Statutes specifically state that “[t]he [nonbinding arbitration] decision 
shall not be made known to the judge who may preside over the case 
unless no request for trial de novo is made as herein provided or unless 
otherwise provided by law.”173 Since the outcome of nonbinding 
arbitration in Florida does not necessarily bind the parties, it is not a 
dispute resolution procedure that purports to resolve the dispute. This 
strongly suggests that nonbinding arbitration under Florida’s procedure 
is not FAA arbitration. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s bright-line rule regarding the fourth factor of 
its standard further supports the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration is 
not FAA arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit stated, “If a dispute resolution 
procedure does not produce some type of award that can be meaningfully 
confirmed, modified, or vacated by a court upon proper motion, it is not 
arbitration within the scope of the FAA.”174 Based on this rule, Florida’s 
nonbinding arbitration procedure is clearly not FAA arbitration because 
nonbinding arbitration does not produce a final award.175 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1240.  
 170. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(3). 
 171. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239. 
 172. FLA. STAT. § 44.103(5) (2013). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239. 
 175. Based on the bright-line rule set forth by the Eleventh Circuit regarding the fourth factor 
of its test, it might seem that there is strong support for the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration 
is within the scope of the FAA if one can prove, contrary to the arguments of this Note, that 
nonbinding arbitration does in fact produce a final award. However, this is not true. Even if 
nonbinding arbitration did meet the Eleventh Circuit’s bright-line rule, that does not necessarily 
bring nonbinding arbitration within the scope of the FAA. The rule is one for determining whether 
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The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning behind its bright-line rule further 
supports the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration is not FAA 
arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a dispute resolution 
procedure that fails to produce a meaningfully confirmable award is not 
FAA arbitration because “[t]he purpose of the FAA is to ‘relieve 
congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method 
of dispute resolution that is speedier and less costly than litigation.’”176 If 
a particular dispute resolution procedure does not produce an award that 
can be meaningfully confirmed, then it is unlikely to alleviate congestion 
in the courts or produce a speedier dispute resolution.177 That is because 
any party that is unhappy with the award can just disregard it and take the 
case to trial.178 If the dispute resolution procedure does not contribute to 
the goals of the FAA, then it is simply illogical to think the FAA would 
govern it.179 
When analyzing nonbinding arbitration in Florida in the context of 
this reasoning, it becomes abundantly clear that it is not FAA arbitration. 
While nonbinding arbitration does produce an award that is technically 
confirmable, it does not produce an award that is meaningfully 
confirmable. This is because a party that is unhappy with the outcome of 
the nonbinding arbitration can disregard the outcome and take the case to 
trial by following some minor procedural requirements. Therefore, if a 
party did not want to participate in nonbinding arbitration but had to do 
so, this would actually increase the amount of time and money spent in 
resolving the dispute.180 This result runs completely counter to the 
intended purpose of the FAA. Thus, if a court construes nonbinding 
arbitration as FAA arbitration, there is a very real possibility that it would 
produce results opposite to Congress’s intent. The likelihood of such a 
result clearly shows that nonbinding arbitration is not FAA arbitration.  
FAA arbitration is meant to be “an alternative to litigation, not an 
                                                                                                                     
a procedure is not within the scope of the FAA; it is not meant to determine by itself whether a 
particular dispute resolution procedure is arbitration within the scope of the FAA. The Eleventh 
Circuit made this clear in a footnote of its opinion in Advanced Bodycare when it stated the 
following about its bright-line rule: “The inverse is not true, however. The presence of an award 
does not by itself make a procedure ‘arbitration’ if the procedures that produce the award bear no 
resemblance to classic arbitration. The parties could not contract for a binding coin flip, with the 
winner to receive an award of his choice, and expect the agreement to be enforced under the 
FAA.” Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239 n.3. 
 176. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 
508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 1240 (“Unlike submitting a dispute to a private adjudicator, which the FAA 
contemplates, compelling a party to submit to settlement talks it does not wish to enter and which 
cannot resolve the dispute of their own force may well increase the time and treasure spent in 
litigation.”).  
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additional layer in a protracted contest.”181 However, nonbinding 
arbitration is not a true alternative to litigation. If the parties must engage 
in it against their wishes, then there is a significant possibility that it will 
simply be “an additional layer in a protracted contest.” Therefore, 
nonbinding arbitration in Florida is clearly not FAA arbitration. 
C.  Why All of This Matters 
Determining whether Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure is 
FAA arbitration is important for two reasons. First, nonbinding 
arbitration is a relatively prevalent procedure in Florida. Therefore, courts 
may have to address this issue one day. Second, the FAA’s governance 
of Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure will significantly impact 
the enforceability of contractual provisions in which the parties stipulate 
nonbinding arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure. 
1.  The Prevalence of Nonbinding Arbitration in Florida 
In Florida, parties can find themselves in nonbinding arbitration in a 
number of ways. For one, the trial court may order parties to submit their 
dispute to nonbinding arbitration before proceeding to a traditional 
trial.182 Additionally, parties may contractually agree to submit disputes 
to nonbinding arbitration before a traditional trial.183 Finally, various 
Florida statutes may require parties involved in “disputes relating to 
condominiums, cooperatives, homeowners associations, mobile home 
park lot tenancies, medical malpractice, and sign owners” to submit their 
disputes to nonbinding arbitration.184 
Nonbinding arbitration appears to be prevalent in Florida’s 
condominium industry as “[n]onbinding arbitration is a mandatory 
condition precedent to maintaining a civil action in matters involving 
certain disputes between condominium associations and unit owners.”185 
Nonbinding arbitration also appears to be prevalent in cooperatives as 
“[t]he law regarding mandatory nonbinding arbitration for disputes 
involving cooperatives is the same for those related to condominiums.”186 
It could also be prevalent in medical malpractice cases as “[a]ny party 
can move for referral to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to [Florida 
                                                                                                                     
 181. Id. at 1240 (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907 
(11th Cir. 2006), abrogation recognized by Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 
1197 (11th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182. See FLA. STAT. § 44.103(2) (2013) (authorizing a court to “refer any contested civil 
action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration”). 
 183. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.800 (“A civil action shall be ordered to arbitration or arbitration 
in conjunction with mediation upon stipulation of the parties.”). 
 184. Morman & Whitcomb, supra note 124. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id.  
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Statutes § 766.107(1)].”187 
2.  The FAA’s Impact on Enforceability 
Relying on the FAA, the Supreme Court has developed a strong policy 
in favor of upholding agreements to arbitrate.188 The Court has stated that 
the FAA reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration[] and the 
‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’”189 
Further, “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”190 
Despite the arguably unconscionable nature of class arbitration 
waivers, the U.S. Supreme Court has followed the FAA’s core principle 
that courts should enforce arbitration agreements according to their 
terms.191 On this basis, the Court has enforced class arbitration waivers 
contained in consumer contracts.192 Enforcing arbitration in such a 
situation exemplifies that when considering the validity of a particular 
dispute resolution agreement under the FAA, courts will almost always 
enforce the dispute resolution agreement. In other words, if parties make 
a dispute resolution agreement and a court considers that dispute 
resolution procedure to be arbitration within the scope of the FAA, the 
court will almost always enforce the agreement. 
For example, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,193 Vincent and 
Liza Concepcion agreed to a cell phone service contract with AT&T.194 
The contract contained a mandatory arbitration provision and a class 
action waiver.195 Despite this waiver, the Concepcions filed a class action 
suit in a federal district court in California.196 In response, AT&T moved 
to compel arbitration.197 The Concepcions opposed AT&T’s motion, 
citing to the saving clause in Section 2 of the FAA, which provides that 
arbitration agreements can be unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist 
                                                                                                                     
 187. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 766.107 (2013) (“In an action for recovery of damages based on the 
death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from 
the negligence of a health care provider . . . the court may require, upon motion by either party, 
that the claim be submitted to nonbinding arbitration.”).  
 188. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747–48 (2011) (noting 
that the FAA preempts state-law rules eroding arbitration). 
 189. Id. at 1745 (citation omitted) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) and Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 
(2010)).  
 190. Id. at 1748. 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 1745–48. 
 192. See, e.g., id. at 1744–45, 1747–48, 1753. 
 193. 131 S. Ct. 1740.  
 194. Id. at 1744. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1744–45. 
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at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”198 On the basis of 
California’s Discover Bank rule,199 which “classif[ied] most collective-
arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable,”200 the 
Concepcions argued that the arbitration provision was 
“unconscionable . . . under California law because it disallowed classwide 
procedures.”201 Therefore, the Concepcions argued that the court should 
not enforce the agreement.202 The district court agreed and denied 
AT&T’s motion.203 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.204 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “whether the FAA 
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration 
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”205 
The Court held that “California’s Discover Bank rule [was] preempted by 
the FAA,” thus upholding the validity of the class arbitration waiver.206 
The Court reasoned that the Discover Bank rule was preempted because 
it required the availability of classwide arbitration, which “interfere[d] 
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.”207 
Since the Court’s decision in Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit has 
upheld the validity of a class action waiver in a similar contract with a 
Florida consumer. In Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,208 Pendergast 
agreed to several consecutive cell phone service contracts with Sprint.209 
The contract at issue contained a mandatory arbitration provision, a class 
action waiver, and a nonseverability clause that voided the arbitration 
agreement if the court found that the class action waiver was 
unenforceable.210 Pendergast filed a class action against Sprint in a 
federal district court in Florida.211 In response, Sprint filed a motion to 
compel arbitration.212 Pendergast argued that the class action waiver was 
“unconscionable and unenforceable under Florida law,”213 and therefore, 
                                                                                                                     
 198. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745, 1746. 
 199. The Discover Bank rule refers to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740.  
 200. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.  
 201. Id. at 1745. 
 202. See id. at 1745–46. 
 203. Id. at 1745.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1744. 
 206. See id. at 1753. 
 207. Id. at 1748. 
 208. 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 209. Id. at 1226–28. 
 210. Id. at 1228. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1229. 
 213. Id. 
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pursuant to the nonseverability clause, the arbitration provision did not 
apply and the court should deny Sprint’s motion.214 The district court 
disagreed and granted Sprint’s motion, finding that the class action 
waiver and arbitration provisions in the contract were enforceable.215 
Pendergast appealed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment granting Sprint’s motion to compel arbitration.216 In 
response to Pendergast’s argument that the class action waiver was 
unconscionable under Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[W]e 
need not reach the questions of whether Florida law would invalidate the 
class action waiver in the parties’ contract because, to the extent it does, 
it would be preempted by the FAA.”217 Further, the court noted that, 
“[u]nder Concepcion, both the class action waiver and the arbitration 
clause must be enforced according to their terms.”218 
The decisions in both Concepcion and Pendergast reflect courts’ 
inclination to enforce FAA arbitration agreements. These decisions show 
that courts will almost always enforce dispute resolution agreements that 
provide for arbitration within the scope of the FAA. Thus, it is important 
to determine whether nonbinding arbitration is within the scope of the 
FAA because this determination will have a strong impact on the 
enforceability of nonbinding arbitration agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Advanced Bodycare provides the 
most logical standard for determining whether a particular dispute 
resolution procedure is FAA arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit’s standard 
is most consistent with the FAA’s purposes. Since this is the most logical 
standard, this Note uses it to determine whether Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration is FAA arbitration. Nonbinding arbitration in Florida does not 
necessarily produce an award that is final and binding on the parties. 
Therefore, under the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, Florida’s nonbinding 
arbitration procedure is clearly not FAA arbitration. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1225. 
 216. Id. at 1226. 
 217. Id. at 1236. 
 218. Id. 
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